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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
' 
Lee Craig Felt, Pl . t"ff A ll t azn i - ppe am , 
LEE C. FELT, a/k/a I 
Case No. 
vs. 12409 
ROBERT S. FELT, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
Plaintiff wife appeals from Order Reducing Ali-
mony. 
DISPOSITION IN LO,VER COURT 
The Court, on defendant-husband's Motion and 
three day hearing reduced alimony from $1,000.00 per 
month to $1.00 per year. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Affirmance. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Parties were married Dec. 17, 1949 and were di. 
vorced May 17, 1967 without having had children. 
Property, including home, automobiles, stock, bonds 
and bank accounts were split down the middle, and de-
fendant-husband, by stipulated settlement, was ordered 
to pay $1,000.00 per month alimony. The Decree was 
adorned with language purporting to forever divest the 
Court of Review. 
" . . . and that said amount shall not hereafter 
be adjusted, notwithstanding increases or de· 
creases in any amount in the income of plaintiff, 
and notwithstanding any changes in the income 
of the defendant unless said changes are sub· 
stantial and so decrease the defendant's income 
so the defendant is reasonably unable to pay the 
alimony agreed to herein." AR p. 11. 
Defendant-husband later complained the Stipula· 
tion and Decree was unreasonable and that he signed 
while under mental and physical duress-
A. (by Dr. Felt) All I can say at this time, I was 
under enough mental and physical duress, 
as Mr. Burton indicates, so as to sign and not 
to contest this is being in fact the best that 
my counsel, who I felt to be skilled and pro· 
fessional, could secure. And although I qu~s· 
tioned that, as well as other portions wh1cn 
2 
* 
haven't been alluded to yet, I was told and 
assured that in view of discussions through 
the counsels that this was proper and that I 
should therefore sign. ( R-373, L 30). 
* * 
A. (Dr. Felt) The substance was, well, any 
Third District Court Judge would agree that 
this was fair and equitable and so 1 think it 
is too. ( R 373, line 27. 
* * * 
Q. So you really weren't prevailed upon in any 
manner to sign this agreement rather than 
not to sign it? 
A. (Dr. Felt) Only to the extent that was the 
best we could do, therefore, ergo, write your 
name, the answer was always the same, well, 
there it is. (R 375, L 22). 
At the time of marriage, defendant-husband had a 
medical doctor's education substantially completed by 
the winter they were married, 1949. 
Q. And so, except for the one quarter and wind-
ing up ceremonies, he had completed his medi-
cal education when you and he were married? 
A. (Mrs. Felt) He had completed his M.D. He 
had not completed his medical education. 
Q. He had not completed his residency nor in-
ternship, you mean? 
A. That's correct. 
The alimony settlemen tindicated court and counsel 
mistakenly thought she had put him through college, 
the alimony settlement reading-
3 
"The amount of the aforesaid alimony for tli 
s1:1pport of Lee C. Felt is a reasonable sum i; 
view of the. eff o~·ts made ?Y plaintiff in assisting 
defendant m his profess10nal education .. , ·· 
AR p. 11. 
whereas his family put him through school which she 
admitted-
Q .... You really didn't assist him in his basic 
education at all, did you? 
A. (Mrs. Felt) 'Vhen he was in college, I dia 
not. (R 316, L 8). 
Q. Who paid for your medical education? 
A. (Dr. Felt) My parents. (R-325, L 21). 
His parents provided an automobile as well-
Q. Besides that, your parents bought you an 
automobile? 
A. (Dr. Felt) Yes, they did. (R-409, L 25), 
and provided them with a duplex ( R-318, L 6) without 
down payment (R-318, L 16). 
Plaintiff-wife had a bachelor's degree in arts at 
the time of marriage (R-289, L 8). She contributed 
modestly to family income while defendant-husband in· 
terned. 
At the time of the diYorce ( 1967) def endant-hus· 
band earned substantially as an eye surgeon and she 
modestly, with intermittent parttime work and defend· 
ant was "suffering and continues to suffer serious health 
problems as a result of the emotional involvements and 
4 
disturbances connected with the divorce matters and 
proceedings herein. (AR p. 18.) 
At the time of Motion for Modification ( 1969), 
plaintiff-appellant-wife was in excellent and vigorous 
health-
Q. You are in vigorous health, are you not? 
A. Yes, I am. )R-291, L 4); 
plays tennis, golf and skates and skis (R-290, L 29), 
was socially prominent (R-291, L 7), without depend-
ents (R-291, L 16), had income from several sources, 
(R-296, L 10)-
Q. So that year of 1968 you had income from 
the Southeast Furniture, and from Circuit 
and Eddington and from Cottonwood Mall 
and you had the alimony and the KUTV? 
A. (Mrs. Felt) Yef!. 
Her salary alone was $8,091. Income from other sources 
$12,078.00; total for 1968, $20,968.00 ( R-296, L 16) ; 
1969 salary without alimony, $8,500.00 or $8,600.00 
(R-297, L 25). 
Plaintiff-wife, after the divorce, voluntarily placed 
herself in the labor market despite $1,000.00 a month 
alimony coming in (R-301, L 26 to 30) earning over 
$9,000.00 in 1969 (R-302, L 2), and besides her salaried 
job, did freelance work on the side ( R-287, L 21) in 
the advertiisng business, did consultant work in addition 
for a television station in which she had acquired an 
ownership interest (R-287, L 26), realized income from 
5 
stocks and bonds in addition ( R-288, L 14), was acquir. 
ing a condominium unit (R-282, L 23), enjoyed medical 
and vaaction benefits in connection with her work (R 
291, L 30) also paid club membership (R-282, L a
1
, 
had obtained "extensive training in the radio and TY 
field" ( R-289, L 10), was admittedly able to earn a 
livelihood ... " ( R-289, L 13) and was voluntarily far 
from dependent-
Q. Let's talk about the present. You have chosen 
to become a self-employed, highly prof es-
sional individual, haven't you? 
A. (Mrs. Felt) Yes. (R-289, L 22) 
and admittedly clung to the alimony to provide for the 
rainy day or "security" (R-301, Ll2)-
So I need this money to try to provide for some 
kind of security if I am an in accident, or if 1 
am out of work for a short amount of time, or 
even a long amount of itme . . " (R-301~ Lll). 
Her voluntary departure from dependency rolls is 
illustrated in other testimony-
Q. The fact remains that in 1968 you volun· 
tarily worked in spite of $1,000.00 a month 
coming in? 
A. I want to get enough ahead that we can for· 
get this. (R-301, L 26) 
Q. In 1969 you voluntarily worked. Did I say 
$7 ,000 odd dollars coming more? ~ore money 
than most girls working in the busmess world 
earned? You voluntarily worked and earned 
another $9,000.00 didn't you? 
A. Yes. (R-302, L 1) 
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The settlement left her with $10,000.00 or so plus 
home equity, (R-220, L 4) (R-219, L 18). 
In connection with the wife's rainy day theory, it is 
notable she wound up with a $50,000.00 life insurance 
policy on his life, doubple indemnity (AR page 6) and 
thereafter sought and obtained another $60,000.00 
double indemnity policy on defendant's life. ( R-210). 
Q. (By Mr. Hunt) Is it double indemnity on 
those? 
MR. BURTON: If you know. 
A. Yes. 
Q. On both of them? 
A. I believe so. 
Q. So they would pay $200,000.00 in the event 
of his death? 
MR. BURTON: By accident. 
To enhance entitlement position, plaintiff-wife tes-
tified she had remained childless but the evidence 
showed she had acquiesced in his sterilization to prevent 
pregnancy because of hereditary muscular dystrophy 
(R-387, L 27), plaintiff knowing this before marriage-
Q. Did you and she discuss this? 
A. Oh, yes. 
Q. Was she in favor of it? 
A. Definitely. 
Q. It was a matter that could have a risk that 
could have been run by both of you, could 
it not? 
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Q. You and she may have had children and hare 
ru~ the ~isk one way or the other of the chilu 
bemg disabled or defective? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And did she help you make this decision? 
A. Yes. ( R-388, L 18) 
And apparently adoption was not considered in the 
early stages of the marriage ( R-388, L 20) , only 8 or 
so years later, (R-388, L 27) and only after the mar-
riage was already on the rocks. (R-389, L 24). She 
earlier testified: 
Q. The Court: Had the difficulty been rather 
long and extended? 
A. (Mrs. Felt) It's been, I think this is some· 
thing I should have done ten years ago but 
I kept trying and trying until obviously there 
was nothing left. (R-22, L 1) 
Defendant-respondent-husband, with generous legal 
assistance, paid substantially the sums ordered until 
health problems-
A. Health problem was a compression syndrome 
resulting in a partial paralysis of the right 
shoulder. (R-378, L 3) 
and neurological problems (R-331, L 15) prompted 
him to seek medical advise from two doctors (R-331, 
L 17) and (R-332, L 1), Dr. Robert Jones and Dr. 
W. Spence, defendant testifying that-
" It became simply mentally and physically im· 
possible to maintain this kind of burden on my· 
8 
.. 
self, or, to say t~e lea~t, of my dependents or, in 
fact, on my patients. (R-330, L 7) 
Defendant fell behind on the alimony, sought relief 
in Court and testified-
A. In my opinion, it is impossible to maintain 
such an alimony figure. (R-329, L 22) 
* * * 
Q. And what else? 
A. And although I managed to maintain these 
alimony payments as long as I could during 
1968, it became simply physically and men-
tally impossible to maintain this kind of bur-
den on myself, or to say the least, of my de-
pendents, or in fact, on my patients. 
Q. Why? 
A. Because the overhead costs and business costs 
associated with running my practice were 
continually on the inflationary rise; although 
my fee structure had remained, and still has 
remained, the same for about 14 years. And 
yet, in order to accomplish this alimony fee, 
it was necessary during the latter part of 
'68-excuse me-of '67 and early part of 
'68 to in effect, rush through more people, 
work longer, maintain a heavier surgical 
schedule, if possible, in order to meet this 
figure. Now this was difficult to do, and 
several effects manifested themselves hv this 
action. First of all, patients who wer~ not 
used to being rushed through in half the time 
would remark, at least to me or at least to 
my girl . . (R-330, L 24) 
* * * 
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THE COURT: Yes. You can state it. 
A. I am not quo~ing necessarily, but people, ot 
course, who did feel inclined to comment le!: 
the impression that this was becoming a fat: 
tory, and maybe it was the work hours wen 
somewhat longer with shorter lunches. Thl 
surgical schedule was more crowded, an~ 
when I got home at night, I was so tired, an~ 
I mean it, that I fell in front of the dinner 
table, and then, from there into bed, kicking 
everything along the way. I didn't have to 
be told that a fuse was going to be blown 
one of these days, and finally, it was. Ana 
later that year, in spite of this type of a 
schedule, as you know, I developed some neu-
rological problems. 
Q. Did you actually consult doctors regarding 
those? 
A. I consulted two physicians, and on their ad-
vice, was instructed-there were a few par· 
ticular measures which I followed, but in 
addition ,was told simply that this sort of 
stuff has got to be stopped, and it was. And 
it still is. 
Q. And were there any instructions, medically, 
with respect to the-you say, this sort of 
stuff. You have got to tell me more what you 
mean by this sort of stuff. 
A. I knew by mid-1969 that this schedule-
this work load, and this burden, whatever you 
want to call it, was not going to work. Now, 
as I said, the reason was because of the way 
I performed, the way it was affecting othe~ 
people. They were not used to this kind ol 
10 
rushing, so I really did not have to be told to 
slow down, but it finally came to that. 
Q. Did you, in fact, consult a doctor? 
A. I consulted two physicians and they both said, 
in effect, the same basic thing, which I knew 
anyway. You can't do this. 
Q. And those doctors were who? 
A. First one was Dr. Jones. He referred me to 
Dr. Spence. 
Q. And Dr. Spence-what is his first name? 
A. Robert Jones. 
Q. Robert Jones, and who, then, is Dr. Spence? 
A. First initial is "\V. I am not familiar with 
his first name. Definitive treatments were 
carried out for two month, and when that 
was finished, in December, as I recall, the 
question came to my mind, well, now, is this 
going to happen again and I was advised 
again not to start pushing again. Any_thing 
can happen. If you want to have trouble 
again, just go back and carry on and do too 
much, and I was again advised, and it w_as 
stressed, and they put it into strong terms 
that this kind of activity ... (R-331, L2) 
Q. But those doctors are here in town and avail-
able to be called if necessary, is that right? 
A. They are. 
Q. Well, Dr. Felt, in your professional work, is 
it professionally advisable in your opinion 
to carry on the type of work load you did in 
'68 and '69? (R-332, L 25) 
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A. My answer would be no. It is not advisable. 
(R-333, L 5) 
Q. So the general advice was, you slow down! 
A. Yes. (R-379, L 16). 
In addition to his personal and health problems, 
Dr. Felt had suffered a drastic price-cost squeeze with 
gross overhead costs, according to schedules prepared 
by a CPA firm, Exhibit 144-D (R-337, L 9) increas· 
ing from $38,000.00 in 1967 to $43,000.00 in 1969 (R· 
336, L 23) Exhibit 14-D and 16-B, gross income down 
from $70,108.00 in 1967 to $67,648.00 in 1969, Exhibit 
14-D, adjusted gross income down $34,040.00 in 1967 
to $38,187.00 in 1968 and $28,014.00 in 1969, Exhibit 
14-D and net income after taxes, etc., down from $17,· 
317.00 in 1967, $17,573.00 in 1968 to $14,395.00 in 
1969, Exhibit 14-D and 15-D-
Q. And your final net income, there is a trend 
downward, is there not? 
A. That's right. 
Q. From $17,000. to $14,000. Is that correct? 
A. Yes. (R-336, L 25) 
Specific cost items testified to, more drastically 
demonstrated the cost-price squeeze. Seminars and 
meetings, by stipulation ( R-341, L 17) necessary in 
this doctor's field, rose drastically upward in costs. (Ex. 
17-D); insurance 1967 to 1970, $311.00 to $1,286.00, 
(R-343, L 29) Exhibit 21-B; base telephone $33.00 to 
$87.00; labor and billing costs, with the same office and 
12 
fee set-up ( R-330, L 15) $465.00 to $900.00; auto in-
surance $136.00 to $207.00; meetings and seminars 
$U62.00 to $3250.00 (R-344, L 22) Exhibit 21-D; rent 
$240.00 to $280.00. 
Remariage and support of a fatherless child in-
creased defendant-husband's family and personal ex-
penses substantially. This was conceded and that per-
sonal and living expenses would be drastically higher, 
albeit applicable to both parties, (R-345, L 21 and L 
28). 
To October 1, 1970, defendant had paid alimony 
of $30,543.83 ( R-386, L 21). 'Vhen the relief given at 
court, a reduction was made conditional upon payment 
of back alimony, he raised and paid the same (R-209), 
$13,923.67, with $1,000.00 per month accruing through 
May, 1971, ( R-211 )-a total of $48,000.00 plus interest 
(R-206) plus costs (R-196), plus attorney's fees (R-
207, etc., etc., and only then was confronted with this 
appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AND NEC-
ESSARILY C 0 M P AR ED CONDITIONS 
THEN, i.e., AT TIME OF DIVORCE, AND NO'V 
IN REDUCING ALIMONY. 
An alimony award is never quite final, but always 
subject to review and modification for good cause 
and changed circumstances. 
13 
.., 
If there is any factor well established in the Utan 
law respecting alimony, it is that the alimony decree 
is always subject to review for good cause shown. 
In an early land mark case, Buzzo vs. Buzzo, 4j 
Utah 625, 148 Pac. 362, where original alimony was 
reduced without the wife's consent, she contending it was 
unchangeable being a consent decree and not only tied 
to a property settlement but payable out of real prop. 
erty, Judge Frick ably wrote: 
"We have a statute (Comp. Laws 1907, section 
1212) which provides that in case a divorce is 
granted the district courts of this state shall have 
the power to make such orders in relation to 'the 
children, property, parties, and the maintenance 
of the parties and children as shall be equitable.' 
It is further provided that 'subsequent changes 
may be made by the court in respect to the dis-
posal of children or the distribution of property, 
as shall be reasonable and proper.' Waiving, for 
the purpose of this decision, the question of 
whether under said statute the courts may modify 
a decree for alimony wherein specific real prop· 
erty is decreed to the wife, or where a fixed lump 
sum is paid to her, yet where, as here, a sum is 
named in the decree of divorce, which is made 
payable monthly, all courts agree that, .un~er 
statutes like ours, the courts upon the application 
of either party have the power to change,. m.odify, 
or revise such a decree, and whenever It IS sat· 
isfactorily made to appear that the circumstances 
and conditions of the parties, or one of them, hav.e 
changed so that the amount originally allowe~ is 
no longer .Just or equitable, the court may modify 
the same." (Citing many cases, New Hamp· 
shire, Wisconsin, California,) (emphasis added)· 
14 
The court further said: 
"'i\T e are ~f the opinion, however, that every de-
cree of divorce and alimony must be deemed 
to have been entered subject to the provisions 
of section 1212, (predecessor of current code pro-
vision) 
All courts agree that if it is provided in the 
decree itself, that it may be modified or revised 
in case the circumstances and conditions of the 
parties have materially changed the modification 
may then be made .... Now, we think that under 
statutes like ours the provision therein contained 
authorizing a change in modification, is as much 
a part of the decree as though it were written 
into it. (Emphasis added). 
As if to emphasize the appropriateness of review 
in these matters, the alimony statute, 30-3-5, Utah Code 
Annotated, which, prior to the 1969 Amendment, read 
as follows: 
"Disposition of property and children. - When 
a decree of divorce is made the court may make 
such orders in relation to the children, property 
and parties, and the maintenance of the parties 
and children, as may be equitable; provided, that 
if any of the children have attained the age of 
ten years and are of sound mind, such children 
shall have the privilege of selecting the parent 
to which they will attach themselves. Such subse-
quent changes or new orders may be made by 
the court with respect to the disposal of the chil-
dren or the distribution of property as shall be 
reasonable and proper. 
was, by said amendment, changed to read as follows: 
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"Disposition of property and children. - When 
a decree of divorce is made the court may make 
such orders in relation to the children, property 
and partie_s, and the maintenance of the partie1 
and children, as may be equitable. 1.'he court shall 
have continuing jurisdiction to rnake such sub. 
sequent changes or new orders with respect to the 
support and maintenance of the parties, the cus-
tody of the children and their support and main-
tenance, or the distribution of the property as 
shall be reasonable and necessary. (Emphasis 
added), 
the underlined words "The court shall have continu-
ing jurisdiction to make ... " being added. Granted 
the change was unnecessary as to continuing jurisdic-
tion, our court having continuously and consistently, 
from the earlie~t cases reiterated the proposition. Whit-
more vs. Har<ling, 3 Utah 121, 1 Pac. 465; Reid vs. 
Reid, 28 Utah 297, 78 Pac. 675. 
In all of the alimony modification cases reviewed 
by this writer, when the modification was sustained by 
the appellate court, the method used by the trier of the 
fact, the trial judge, was similar to that used in the 
instant case, i.e., a review of the situation at time of 
divorce as against the circumstances of parties at time 
of motion for modification. Many of the reviews were 
exhaustive as in the instant case and as indicated in 
the Slaughter v. Slaughter case 18 Utah 2d 274, 421 
P .2d 503, indeed, the trial court is obligated to inquire 
and review and familiarize itself with the circumstances 
(then and now) , otherwise, how else could he determine 
what is "just and equitable" at a given time? 
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Indeed, the pattern of our Supreme Court is to 
aff lfm drastic revisions respecting alimony and support 
where the record indicates that the review is thorough 
and that the trial court rendered its modification based 
on a thorough understanding of all factors. This was 
illustrated by Harri.son vs. Harrison, 22 Utah 2d 180, 
450 Pac. 2d 456, where the Supreme Court affirmed 
a drastic revision upward in alimony and three years 
after the divorce decree split up a $10,000.00 bank ac-
count. 
Gallegos vs. Stringham, 21 Utah 2d 139, 442 Pac. 
2d 30, albeit not a modification case but an ordinary 
appeal, comments on the latitude of the trial court-
"' ... Due to the perrogatives and the advantaged 
position of the trial judge, he has a compara-
tively wide latitude of discretion in determining 
the rights and duties of the parties to a divorce 
in order to provide the most equitable and prac-
tical basis for them to readjust their lives in as 
happy and useful manner as possible .... This 
judgment should not be upset unless it appears 
that it works such an inequity or injustice, or 
places one of the parties in such an impractical 
situation that equit,Y and good conscience demand 
that it be revised. We are not persuaded that he 
abused the discretion which is reposed in him in 
such matters." 
In Slaughter vs. Slaughter, 18 Utah 2d 274, 421, P.2d 
.503 (alimony appeal affirmed), this court commented 
on the type of review carried on by the trial court say-
mg-
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" . . . It is our impression that the trial courl 
h.as given consc~entious and judicious consider
11
• 
tzon to the various factors appropriate to con. 
sider in such situations and has entered the de. 
cree which he deems just and equitable in the 
circumstances. See Wilson v. Wilson, 5 Utan 
2d 79, 296 P.2d 977; MacDonald v. MacDonala. 
120 Utah 573, 236 P 2d 1066; Habbeshaw ,: 
Habbeshaw, 17 Utah 2d 285, 409 P 2d 972. We 
are not persuaded that he abused the broad dfa. 
cretion which is reposed in him in such matters. 
(Emphasis added). 
In the Whitmore vs. Harding case, 3 Utah 121, J 
Pac. 465, the court reviewed the eccleastical, chancery 
and legislative history of divorce and affirmed the con· 
tinuing right of reviews of the then Third Districl 
Court over the previous decision of the then Probate 
Court citing the Territorial Statute Comp. Laws of 
1852, Sec. 6, as providing, among other things-
"When a divorce is decreed, the court shall make 
such order in relation to the children and prop· 
erty of the parties and the maintenance of the 
wife and such portion of the children as shall 
be awarded to her, as may be just and equitable 
... provided further, that when it shall appear 
to the court at a, future time that it would be for 
the interest of the parties concerned that a change 
should be effected in regard to the former dis· 
posal of children or distribution of property, 
the court shall have power to make such change 
as will be conducive to the best interests of all 
parties concerned." Section 3 of 'An act in rela· 
tion to guardians,' also in force at that time, pro· 
vides: 'When a divorce is decreed or obtained. 
such order in relation to the children and prop· 
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erty of the parties, and the maintenance of the 
wife, may be made as shall be deemed right and 
proper; subsequent changes may be made by the 
probate court or selectmen in those respects when 
circumstances render them expedient." (Em-
phasis added) . 
In Reid vs. Reid, 28 Utah 297, 78 Pac. 675, the 
Court cited and relied on the 'Vhitmore case emphasiz-
ing that the trial court's action would not be set aside 
except for abuse of discretion and affirmed the trial 
court's decision and commented-
"Should appellant be thrown out of employment, 
or for any legitimate reason be unable to pay the 
amount now fixed by the court, the court may, 
in the exercise of its own judicial discretion un-
der Section 1212 Rev. St. 1898 make such order 
in the premises as will be just and equitable to 
both parties." 
The term "just and equitable" and the authority 
of the court on modification to make such changes as 
are just and equitable under the circumstances, the lan-
guage used in the memorandum decision herein, is con-
sistently and repeatedly found in a review of the Utah 
alimony medification cases. 
In commenting upon the retention of jurisdiction, 
the Supreme Court made an interesting comment in 
Bott vs. Bott, 20 Utah 2d 329 437 Pac. 2d 684, as fol-
lows: 
" ... Under our statutes, the court retains juris-
diction of the parties to modify the decree with 
respect to the distribution of the property. Sec-
19 
tion 30-3-5 UCA 1953, Doe vs. Doe, 48 Utafi 
200, 158 Pac. 781. Especially should this be tru1 
where the parties volnntarily litigate a matter 
over which the court has jurisdiction." (Empha. 
sis added.) 
-
" ( 1-4) In reviewing the trial court's order in dJ. 
vorce proceedings there are certain well estao. 
lished principles to be borne in mind. The find. 
ings and order are endowed with a prcsumptio1
1 
of validity, and the burden is upon the appelum! 
to show they are in error. Even though our con. 
stitutional provision, Section 9 of Article VIIJ, 
states that in equity cases this court may review 
the facts, we nevertheless take into account the 
advantaged position of the trial judge. Accord· 
ingly, we recognize that it is his prerogative h1 
judge the credibility of the witnesses, and in 
case of conflict, we assume that the trial court 
believed the evidence which supports the findings. 
We review the whole evidence in the light mosl 
favorable to them; and we will not disturb them 
merely because this court might have viewed the 
matter differently, but only if the evidence clear· 
ly preponderates against the findings. 
( 5) For similar reasons, the trial court is al· 
lowed a comparatively wide latitude of discre· 
tion in determining what order should be made 
in such matters; and we will not upset his judg· 
ment and substitute our own unless it clear/,lf 
appears that the trial court abused its discretion 
or misapplied the law. The following are a few 
examples of innumerable cases supporting tht 
principles just stated: Slaughter v. Slaughter, 
18 Utah 2d 274, 421 P.2d 503; Dahlberg v. Dalu 
berg, 77 Utah 157, 92 P.2d 214; Hendricks r 
Hendricks, 91 Utah 553, G3 P.2d 277; Anderson 
20 
.D 
rt 
s. 
ii 
m 
lt 
/'· 
J. 
I· 
le 
J. 
' 1.~ 
11, 
w 
lf 
·r, 
J. 
'" ID 
Y. Anderson, 104 Utah 104, 138 P.2d 252; Allen 
v. Allen, 109 Utah 99, 165 P.2d 872; Alldredge 
v. Alldredge, 119 Utah 504, 229 P.2d 681, 34 
A.L.R.2d 305 ( 1951); Pinion v. Pinion, 92 Utah 
255, P.2d 265. (Emphasis added). 
In Whitehead v. Whitehead, 16 Utah 2d 179, 397 
P. 2d 987, (alimony appeal, affirmed), this court re-
iterated-
"Due to the prerogatives reposed in him under 
the law and to his advantaged position, the trial 
judge must necessarily be allowed a wide latitude 
of discretion in such matters, and his judgment 
should not be changed lightly, nor at all unless 
under the fact shown by the evidence it works 
a manifest inequity or injustice." 
If ever a court performed necessary surgery after 
exhaustive search and discovery, and effected a neces-
sary modification in the interest of equity and justice, 
it is in the instant case. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT PROPERLY FOUND SUBSTAN-
TIAL CHANGED CONDITIONS. 
A. WIFE'S GOOD HEALTH, HIGH EARN-
INGS, ADMITTED LACK OF NEED, IN-
VESTMENT POSITION, UTILIZATION OF 
EDUCATION AND TRAINING WAR-
RANTED REDUCTION. 
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Plaintiff argues that events specifically contem 
plated by the parties in the divorce decree cannot war 
rant change in alimony. In the first place the change, 
that have taken place could not have been contem. 
plated. She was in poor health at the time of the divorct 
and in vigorous health at the time of Motion to Reduct 
alimony. Her income then was near non-existence ana 
at the time of reduction, approximately $8,500.00 pe1 
year plus the alimony plus consultation fees, plus invest. 
ment income plus free lance advertising work. She wa1 
unemployed at the time of the divorce decree and wi~ 
a bachelor's degree and therafter obtained extensin 
training in television, radio advertising, etc,. volun· 
tarily abandoned a dependent position and status anJ 
became full time employed plus, vigorously utilizin1 
her extensive education and training, hanging on to 
the alimony only to save for the rainy day (R. 301 L. 
12). 
These changes could not have been contemplated at the 
time of the decree. 
Furthermore, the unwarranted language in the 
decree seeking to divest the court of future jurisdiction 
to change the same, with documents prepared by tht 
plaintiff and only summarily read by defendant-
"A. Probably IO minutes to read it." (R-321 
L 27) 
could not divest the court of its power to exercise con· 
tinuing jurisdiction. In Callister vs. Callister, I Utan 
2d 34 261, Pac. 2nd 944, which was a proceeding In 
modify a decree based on an agreement and proper!) 
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settlement arrangement to provide alimony for life, 
and in which the language was rather severe, the Court 
held that it did not thereby lose its right to make such 
modification or change thereafter as might be appro-
priate Lased on changed circumstances. The court said, 
page 37: 
"It is generally held that under such a statute 
the court can modify a decree for alimony re-
gardless of whether the decree was based upon 
an agreement of the parties." 
There the plaintiff was awarded $400.00 per month 
during the life of the plaintiff or until her remarriage" 
and certain property was divided. Several years later 
plaintiff asked the court to reduce the alimony from 
$400.00 to $200.00 per month, alleging reduced income, 
$1,000.00 to $600.00 per month, health impairment, re-
marriage and a wife and child to support and necessity 
to abstain from activities producing physical or mental 
strain; also, the plaintiff, on the other hand, had rental 
income and income from investments and stocks and 
the trial court's modification was affirmed. 
In that case, the plaintiff, seeking to sustain the 
position that the alimony for life provision was a part 
of a property settlement division and, therefore, un-
touchable in the future by the court cited various non-
Utah decisions including California decisions respecting 
property settlement decrees. The Utah Supreme Court, 
in response, page 40, noted: 
"A subsequent opinion by the Supreme Court 
of California, Hough v. Hough, 26 Cal. 2d 605, 
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160 P.2d 15, 18, clarifies and appears to set a! 
rest the law of California relative to the issu 
here under discussion. It quotes with appron\ 
the following from 39 Michigan Law Revie· 
128: ' 
'Assuming that the court has power by statuti 
to modify a decree not based on contract, 
1
t 
would seem that in the view of most courh 
there is no sufficient reason to take the decret 
based on contract out of the operation of tlie 
statute as to the alimony provisions. That tnt 
interest of the state in the marital status ana 
the dissolution thereof is sufficient reason trJ 
support such a view hardly reems to requirt 
demonstration. * * * The obligation to par 
alimony or support money to a divorced wift 
is one peculiarly justified by considerations ol 
social desirability and generally prescribed a1 
a consequence to dissolution of the marital 
relation. Being a continuing obligation, ano 
being subject to scrutiny of the courts as to 
fairness and adequacy at its inception, it shoula 
so remain and the contract of the parties shoula 
not be allowed to oust the court of power other· 
wise exercisable.' ,, (Emphasis added). 
The court in the Callister case further noted that 
(as in the instant case) the property was a pproximatel1 
equally divided and the alimony provision for life addea 
There as in the instant case plaintiff contended the court 
had erroneously reviewed the situation of parties anti 
that the evidence did not support the trial court's Find· 
ings nor Conclusions; however, this court found that ili1 
trier of the facts had properly reviewed income, worl 
load, mental strain, income from stock and investrnenll 
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etc., etc., etc., at the time of the divorce as against the 
time of the application for modification, same as in the 
instant case. 
The general rule cited in plaintiff's brief, page 21, 
attributable to 18 ALR 2d 10, is apparently not the 
rule in Utah according to the Callister case where Judge 
Hoyt wrote, page 38: 
"This view (property settlement with monthly 
payments for life not subsequently modifiable) 
is opposed to the majority of appellant decisions 
as appears from annotations in 18 ALR 1047, 
1050, and 101 ALR 324, 326, and is not in har-
mony with views of this Court as announced in 
Murphy vs. Moyle, 17 Utah 113, 53 Pac. 1010. 
The Utah stafote at the time of that decision 
was substantially the same as now. The court 
said: 'This statute is broad and comprehensive 
... and the court may afterwards, if occasion 
shall require it, make such change in any decree 
as 'will be conducive to the best interest of all 
parties concerned.' " 
And in Mathie vs. Mathie, 12 Utah 2d 116, 363 
Pac. 2d 779, albeit not a modification case, this court 
roundly held that, 
"The parties cannot by contract completely de-
feat the authority expressly conferred upon the 
court by our statutes, Sec. 30-3-5, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, in cases of divorce, to make 
such orders in relation to property as may be 
equitable.'' (Empasis added). 
Cody v. Cody, 47 Utah 456, 154, P. 952, cited 
in plaintiff's brief, page 22 and page 10, is simply no 
25 
help to plaintiff on any point, it merely decreeing tlrni· 
alimony not initially granted cannot later be awardei 
the wife at divorce having been denied alimony and Jileo 
for alimony long after rendition of the decree. 
Allen v. Allen, 25 Utah 2d 87, 475 P. 2d 1021.· 
cited by plaintiff, page 22, is no assistance to plaintiff-
it does not hold that contemplated changes will not 
warrant a modification. It simply found there was n1, 
supbstantial change. The court (Judge Ruggeri)-
"Bear in mind that the burden of showing, 
substantial change of circumstances is upon th1 
defendant, the facts in the instant case failed tri 
support the intervention of this court, and tn1 
trial court's judgment is affirmed with costs tu 
the plaintiff." ) 
The Short v. Short case, 25 Utah 2d 326, 481, P. 
2d 54, cited by plaintiff is a case where the trier of tht 
facts, to whom we must give the benefit of the douot 
in ferreting out the facts, found insufficient change ol 
circumstances to warrant a modification. Mrs. Short 
had been employed, was awarded $75.00 alimony anu 
upon her going back to work, Mr. Short requested elimi· 
nation of alimony. 
The court found that she couldn't have contem· 
plated living on a mere $7 5.00, therefore the fact ot 
a subsequent salary did not warrant elimination of tbt 
alimony. 
In commenting on this case, the plaintiff's brie1 
fails to reveal that here the trial court, charged wiili 
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responsibility, and given the latitude to pick and choose, 
discover, weigh and determine, found inadequate 
grounds to modify the decree, opposite from the instant 
case. Also, unlike the instant case where exploration 
was exhaustive, comparative procedures in the Short 
case were so meager that the Supreme Court commented, 
"There is the one point on appeal: that the court 
erred in failing to compare the parties' present 
circumstances in relation to those at the time of 
the decree." 
In the instant case, the plaintiff was sick, dependent, 
only partially trained, earned meagerly from intermit-
tent parttime work and lived high. At the time of the 
application for reduction, she was full itme employed 
and had income from freelance work plus consultation 
fees plus investments, plus broadcasting company part 
ownership and was in vigorous health, had taken on a 
rather new way of life, had an income of close of nine 
thousand dollars without alimony and over twenty thou-
sand dollars with alimony, and did not really live "high" 
so to speak but rather modestly, stashing the money 
away for the rainy day. (R-301, L 12) where she com-
mented: 
" ... so I need this money to try to provide for 
some kind of security if I am in an accident or 
if I am out of work for a short amount of time 
or even a long amount of time . . . " 
The very definition of alimony contemplates main-
tenance and support-not the creation of an estate for 
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retirement. See Hogland vs. Hogland, 19 Utah 103,., 
Pac. 20, where the court said: 
"Alimony is defined to be an allowance whir 
a husband, by order of court, pays to his wi/, 
living separate from him, for her maintenance 
That the complete change-over was voluntary 
unquestioned: 
Q. The fact remains that in 1968 you volu: 
tarily worked in spite of $1,000.00 a moot 
coming in? 
A. (Mrs. Felt) I want to get enough ahead ili 
we can forget this. (R-301, L 27) 
Q. In 1969 you voluntarily worked, a~ I sa, 
$7,000.00 odd dollars coming in - mor 
money than most girls working in the busine· 
world earned-you voluntarily worked an 
earned another $9,000.00, didn't you? 
A. Yes. 
Apparently Mrs. Felt believes she must expedi 
creation of an estate at Dr. Felt's expense, lest his heall 
fail in the future. 
Q. At the present time then, you are in vigoro\ 
health and fully employed and employa~. 
and earning enough to sustain yourself. Wk 
you are really working for is old ~ge in ili 
future? That is what you are worried about 
A. I can live from day to day if nothing gl'I 
wrong. 
Q. 'Vhy don't we eliminate this alimony tdrnt 
such time as you are sick or unemploye ' 
unemployable? 
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A. Maybe at that time Dr. Felt will be sick or 
unemployed. 
If Dr. Felt died she would receive $110,000.00 on 
insurance plus double indemnity benefits if applicable. 
n. HUSBAND'S INCREASED COSTS, DE-
CEASED NET EARNINGS, INCREASED 
LIYING EXPENSES, AND OTHER FAC-
TORS ARE GROUNDS FOR REDUCTION 
OF ALIMONY. 
As against her change over from a dependent, se!lli-
trained, intermittent part time working person to a con-
sultant in her chosen field and in an investment posi-
tion defendant-husband found himself in a serious cost-
price squeeze substantially reducing his net income 
despite drasticaly increased personal and home expenses 
and new responsibilities and in addition, found his 
health seriously jeopardized with doctors warning him 
to slow down or suffer the consequences, and he con-
cluding he was prostituing his profession to maintain 
the alimony. The circumstances drove him to seek medi-
cal and legal advice and relief from the equity arm of 
this court. Thereupon the trier of the fact, with inches 
of discovery material at its disposal and three days of 
testimony, found-
" . . . By reason of a change of circumstances, 
the court- has found that decree has become un-
just and unreasonable." (R-472, L 18) 
l\ erertheless, alimony was continued through eight 
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more months from the hearing date, $8,000.00 more 
then to be not eliminated, but reduced to $1.00. 
In other words, she can still lean on him for tfi, 
rainy day she is concerned about. And the court dii, 
not disturb the life insurance benefits. 
In the Sorense nvs. Sorensen case, 20 Utah 2d 30~ 
438 Pac. 2d 180, heavily relied upon by plaintiff, theri 
was simply a failure of proof showing substantial change 
This court (Judge Harding) in commenting, said: 
"In regard to ( e) (adult daughter in home sinc1 
married) there is no showing as to who furnisheo 
the daughter's support in the mother's home or 
who paid for whose schooling or other expensei 
... As to ( f), no evidence was given or offereo 
to show the amounts of income therefrom to sup· 
port this ground. (Substantial improvement in 
liquidity of wife's separate property). 
Of note is this comment in the Sorensen case-
"The rules governing modification of the alimorn 
portion of a divorce decree grants the trial cow: 
the advantage of some discretion, since the parti~ 
are usually before the court and a sounder ap 
praisal of the situation can be made ... " 
POINT III 
THE COURT MADE A NECESSARY ANf 
WELL FOUNDED AND JUST REDUCTIO) 
OF ALIMONY BASED ON EXHAUSTIVE IX 
QUIRY INTO CONDITIONS THEN AND NO\I 
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REVEALING MATERIAL CHANGE AND 
UNFAIR ALIMONY UNDER CHANGED CON-
DITIONS. 
A salient factor in this case is the voluntary place-
ment by plaintiff of herself in the labor market in a 
highly professional capacity, intimately trained with 
two degrees. 
It is important that her salary is high and that she 
obtains consulting fees for advisory work and free lance 
work. It is important that she has voluntarily chosen a 
modest way of living, investing and saving for security 
purposes. She is in vigorous health, participating in all 
activities with broad social contacts. She admits she 
does not need his helpto live on-only to save for the 
future. She almost but not quite admitted that the ali-
mony should be eliminated-
Q. It is with reluctance you accept alimony? 
A. I want it right now because I need it. I don't 
like it. I wish I didn.'t have to. 
Q. 'Vhy not eliminate alimony until such time 
as you are sick, unemployed or unemployable? 
Mr. Burton: I object to that question. It's not 
relevant. (R-3044, L 15). 
* * * 
Q. 'Vhy don't we eliminate this alimony until 
such time as you are sick or unemployed or 
unemployable? 
A. Maybe at that time Dr. Felt will be sick or 
unemployed. ( R-303, L 2) . 
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It is apparent from the marriage settlement agret 
ment that counsel involved mistakenly assumed she ha,1 
put him through college but the record completely dil 
pells that theory. Also, the writer of the decree over 
stepped in trying to divest the court of future inheren: 
statutory alimony review authority and it is an elemen 
tary rule of construction that documents should be inter 
preted most severely against those who produced anc 
wrote them. It is salient that defendant tried valiantl1 
to keep up the alimony but failed finding it no longe1 
possible. (R-329, L 21), "physically and mentally im 
possible." ( R-330, L 9) 
We cannot help but be impressed by the evidencr 
indicating-
" Patients who are not used to being rushea 
through in half the time ... " ( R-330, L 23) 
"The surgical schedule was more crowded ano 
when I got home at night I was so tired, and I 
mean it, that I fell in front of the dinner ta bk 
and from there into bed, kicking everything aloni 
the way ... " (R-331, L 8) 
"And later that year, in spite of this type ol 
schedule, as you know, I developed some neuro· 
logical problems." (R-331, L 15.) 
Defendant sought medical help and was told to slow 
down-
A. I consulted two physicians and they both saiil 
in effect the same basic thing which I knew 
anyway. You can't do this ... 
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... treatments were carried on for two months 
and then when that was finished, I was advised 
again not to start pushing again. ( R-332, L IO) 
'Vith the fee schedule remaining substantially the 
same (R-330, L 15) and overhead costs higher, many 
of them drastically-Exhibit 21-D and Exhibit 17-D) 
with gross income actually decreasing (Exhibit 14-D), 
and net income drastically reduced (Exhibit 14-D; also 
tax returns), and these facts are not in dispute what-
soever, we cannot question the substance of the change 
in defendant-husband's circumstances as concluded by 
the trier of the facts. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's inquiry was rather exhaustive. 'iV e 
cannot deny that it must have provided a broad acquaint-
ance with the situation of parties at time of the divorce 
and at time of application for modification. The court 
found the $1,000.00 per month alimony no longer just, 
necessary or equitable. We are only left to inquire if 
the record viewed in light most favorable to defendant-
husband sustains the finding. The respective situations, 
then and now, of parties, was weighed-health, training, 
education, income, investment situation, overhead costs, 
tax obligations, etc.-and the pre-trial discovery was 
mountainous. 
'Ve submit that the changes in the situation of 
either party warranted a reduction in alimony and that 
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the combined changes and fairness to parties compel 
the modification arrived at. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GAYLE DEAN HUNT 
Attorney for Defendant-
Respondent-H us band 
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